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Re: Further critique of Kant's unreason

Well, when I hypothetically identified "reality", "phenomenon" and "external world" I of course did it irrespective to Kant, so the term "phenomenon" here is certainly not Kantian. But your answer seems to suggest that you see some legitimacy in Kantian notions of "phenomenon" and "thing-in-itself". My main point on this matter is that "thing-in-itself" cannot be posited as existent, so I cannot understand what you mean by my supposedly "referring to Kant's noumenal world".

Of course Kant cannot claim that noumenon is knowable, but what I tried to show is that noumenon, when seen from Indian perspective, can only be phenomenon (not in Kantian sense), and in this status certainly knowable, although false. Further, I did not try to differentiate reality from thing-in-itself in Kant, but supposed that "external world" cannot be reduced to "thing-in-itself". That is to say Kant must presuppose external world to make more sophisticated conception of it (indeed split of it) in the form of "thing-in-itself".

What I want to pay special attention to concerning Indian philosophy is that all schools of it, both "idealists" and "realists", atmavadins and anatmavadins, theists and atheists etc. cannot conceive phenomenon without knowledge of it and precisely because of this cannot suppose unknowable and existent thing-in-itself. What I called "principle of knowledge" is thus more general consideration than the idealism/realism debate, and it seems to me quite compatible with the "principle of induction" (irrespective of its understanding by Indians) and your understanding of phenomenology. According to all this, the assertion that Indians identified real with mental seems to be forced at least. So, I certainly did not use the term "phenomenon" in the Kantian sense in my last message.

Re: Further critique of Kant's unreason

Hi Sentience. This is my last post on this string, as I cannot devote more time to this.

I reiterate that phenomenon refers to appearance - this is not just my opinion, but generally accepted. You have misunderstood this term, as well as (to a lesser extent) other terms you have been using.

I assumed that you actually read my booklet A Short Critique of Kant's Unreason, but it does not look like you did so. If so, I recommend you read this book. You should also first read the booklet Hume's Problems with Induction, to better understand the background of Kant. Most of all, I recommend you read my book Phenomenology.

Thank you for your interest. Best regards, Avi

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